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Group Legal Services and the Right 
of Association 
1089 
The United States Supreme Court has recently curtailed the 
reach of state statutes that prohibit solicitation of legal business. In 
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two unprecedented opinions the Court has held that the soliciting 
activities of lay organizations fall within the protection of the right 
of association. 
National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. 
Button1 grew out of Virginia's plan of massive resistance to school 
integration.2 The state expanded its anti-solicitation statutes in 1956 
to include group activities3 in an attempt to suppress an NAACP 
system which secured litigants through meetings conducted to ex-
plain the legal means for desegregation. It was common practice at 
such gatherings to distribute forms which authorized the NAACP or 
Defense Fund attorneys to represent the signers in subsequent civil 
rights litigation. The United States Supreme Court held that anti-
solicitation statutes could not constitutionally be applied to prohibit 
these activities. In the context of NAACP objectives, association for 
the promotion of litigation was protected by the right of association, 
and Virginia had shown no valid reason for restraining the exercise 
of this first amendment freedom.4 
A similar issue arose in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. 
1. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
2. 371 U.S. at 445-46 (Douglas, J., concurring). See note 35 infra. 
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 (1958), as amended, Va. Acts Extra Sess. 
1956 ch. 33. The prohibitions read in pertinent part (amendments in italics): 
"§ 54-74 ••. (6) 'Any malpractice, or any unlawful or dishonest or unworthy or 
corrupt or unprofessional conduct,' as used in this section, shall be construed to 
include the improper solicit:ition of any legal or professional business or employ-
ment, either directly or indirectly, OT the acceptance of employment, retainer, 
compensation or costs from any person, partnership, corporation, organization 
or association with knowledge that such person, partnership, corporation, 
organization or association has violated any provision of article 7 of this 
chapter ...• 
"§ 54-78 •.. (1) A 'runner' or 'capper' is any person, corporation, partnership 
or association acting in any manner or in any capacity as an agent for an 
attorney at law within this State or for any person, partnership, corporation, 
organization or association which employs, retains OT compensates any attorney 
at law in connection with any judicial proceeding in which such person, partner-
ship, corporation, organization or association is not a party and in which it 
has no pecuniary right or liability, in the solicitation or procurement of business 
for such attorney at law or for such person, partnership, corporation, organization 
or association in connection with any judicial proceedings for which such 
attorney or such person, partnership, corporation, organization or association 
is employed, retained or compensated. . • • 
"§ 54-79 ..• It shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, partnership or 
association to act as a runner or capper as defined in § 54-78 to solicit any 
business for an attorney at law or such person, partnership, corporation, organ-
ization or association. • • ." 
4. 371 U.S. at 431, 444. See text accompanying notes 16, 17 & 35 infra. Mr. Justice 
Douglas concurred, noting that the Virginia statute apparently reflected a legislative 
purpose to penalize the NAACP. Mr. Justice White concurred in part but dissented 
from the apparent breadth of the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by 
Justices Clark and Stewart, dissented on the ground that Virginia had a valid interest 
in imposing "reasonable regulations limiting the permissible form of litigation and 
the manner of legal representation within its borders." 371 U.S. at 455. He concluded 
that such regulation was undeniably a matter of legitimate concern to the state 
and its "possible impact on ·the rights of expression and association [was] • • • far 
too remote to cause any doubt as to [the statute's] ••• validity.'' Ibid. 
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Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar.5 The union maintained a legal 
aid program which divided the country into sixteen regions where 
attorneys or firms with a reputation for skill in personal injury 
litigation were selected upon the advice of local counsel and judges. 
After injury to a union worker, a Brotherhood representative would 
recommend that the claim not be settled before consultation with an 
approved regional attorney.6 The Virginia courts held that state anti-
solicitation statutes proscribed this arrangement, and they enjoined 
the Brotherhood from "holding out lawyers selected by it as the only 
approved lawyers to aid the members or their families; .•. or in any 
other manner soliciting or encouraging such legal employment of 
selected lawyers."7 The United States Supreme Court vacated this 
ruling, holding that the union's activities were protected from state 
interference by the first amendment.8 
These cases underscore two notable trends in recent constitu-
tional interpretation. First, the decisions point up the increasing em-
phasis placed by the Court on the necessity for competent attorneys 
in all stages of legal proceedings. This right to counsel has recently 
been expanded in a line of criminal cases.9 Brotherhood and Button 
may intimate analogous considerations in civil litigation. Viewed as 
an initial step within this development, the cases may simply stand 
for the proposition that lay organizations may develop and utilize the 
particular legal aid programs approved by the Court.10 
It is apparent, however, that the decisions are of broader signifi-
cance. The Court placed no discernible limitations on the exercise 
of the right to establish group legal services. Consequently, the cases 
raise implications for the bar which may require a change in the 
traditional approach to the practice of law. Typically, both attor-
neys and laymen have been forbidden to engage in the solicitation 
5. 377 U.S. 1 (1964), rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964). 
6. Id. at 4. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Id. at 8. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the disposition of the case. Mr. 
Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented on the ground that "the potential 
for evil in the union's system is enormous" and, therefore, that it is a valid subject 
of state regulation. 377 U.S. at 12. He found the Button decision inapposite authority 
to support the majority opinion because Brotherhood's personal injury litigation 
was not a "form of political expression." Id. at 10. Compare text accompanying 
notes 18-23, 36 & 37 infra. 
9. E.g, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (refusal to let defendant consult 
with counsel during interrogation violates due process); Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201 (1964) (admission at trial of incriminating statements made after indictment 
and without benefit of counsel violates fifth and sixth amendments); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel made applicable to state prosecu• 
tions). 
10. See Simpson, Group Legal Services-The Case for Caution, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 
327 (1965). But see Bodle, Group Legal Services-The Case for BRT, 12 U.C.L.A.L. 
REv. 306, 323 (1965). 
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of legal business and related activities.11 Under the decisions in 
Button and Brotherhood, however, the exercise of legislative or 
judicial power to control the legal profession has been severely cur-
tailed by the first amendment protection seemingly granted to group 
legal aid programs similar to those in the principal cases. Bar canons, 
rules of professional conduct, and state legislation must be re-
evaluated and brought into conformity with allowable group legal 
aid programs.12 It is clear that such programs fall within basic needs 
of our legal system, and the bar will no longer be permitted to ignore 
these needs.13 
The Button and Brotherhood cases are also indicative of a second 
trend in recent constitutional interpretation. The decisions em-
phasize not only the broad sweep that has been granted to first 
amendment freedoms generally, but also the recent developments in 
the area of associational rights. This generalized right of association 
has developed only within the last decade as a cognate to freedom of 
assembly.14 In its first clear enunciation, the right was limited to the 
holding that every citizen should have the freedom to engage in 
political expression and association.15 This definition was subse-
quently expanded to include association for the advancement of 
beliefs and ideas.16 
Button re-examines the scope to be afforded the right of as-
sociation. While, arguably, the decision approves of association for 
11. See, e.g., note 3 supra, notes 12 & 31 infra. 
12. It appears that canons 28 ("stirring up litigation, directly or through agents'), 
35 ("intermediaries') and 47 ("aiding the unauthorized practice of law') of the 
American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics now require some re-
writing. In addition, many state rules of professional conduct (e.g., CAL, Bus. & PROF. 
CODE § 6076) will need revision, as will state statutes similar to those of Virginia. 
This far-reaching development has naturally aroused a great amount of bar dis-
approval, as evidenced b)i the approximately forty state and four local bar associations 
which joined in the ABA petition for rehearing of the Brotherhood decision. 377 
U.S. 960 (1964). 
13 See The Availability of Counsel and Group Legal Services-A Symposium, 
12 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 279, 280 (1965), where Professor Schwartz notes that: "What 
is strikingly significant about this array of discussions is that with only one dissent 
the contributors to the Symposium agree that [Brotherhood] .•• heralds a new era 
for the legal profession; that the change was a long time coming; and that there 
is now an opportunity, perhaps the first in history, for the Bar-free of the type of 
restrictions struck down in • • • [Brotherhood]-to fulfill its primary function of 
providing legal services for those who are in need of them." Cf. MURPHY & PRITCHE'IT, 
COURTS, JUDGES, AND PoLmcs 274-311 (1961). 
14. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (Black, J., concurring). One 
commentator views the right of association as not fully incorporated into the right 
of assembly. .ABERNATIIY, THE RIGHT OF AssEMBLY AND AssoCIATION 237 (1961). 
Another writer, on the other hand, argues that "associational rights, to the extent 
they exist, are not derived solely from the first amendment. Rather they are implied 
in the whole constitutional framework for the protection of individual liberty in 
a democratic society." Emerson, Freedom of Assodation and Freedom of Expression, 
74 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1964). 
15. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
16. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
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the promotion of any litigation, the language of the opinion is much 
narrower. The Court was careful to point out that "for such a 
group, association for litigation may be the most effective form of 
political association."17 The import of the Court's reasoning thus 
could be interpreted as limiting protection to associational activities 
that facilitate goals basically political in character, a conclusion con-
sonant with the traditional orderly group activity protected by the 
first amendment. 
Brotherhood, on the other hand, appears to fall outside the 
limitations enunciated in earlier decisions. In this case the Court 
protected the union's activity on the grounds that the privilege of 
members to assist and advise each other was indispensable to imple-
mentation of rights granted by Congress under the Safety Appliance 
Act18 and the Federal Employers Liability Act.19 Assuming the right 
to associate was necessary to preserve the efficacy of these federal 
statutes,20 it nevertheless seems that the result in the case might 
better have been rested on the basis of the supremacy clause21 instead 
of the first amendment. Defending the union's plan as necessary to 
preserve rights granted under federal laws is perhaps understandable, 
but to equate this protection with the reach of the first amendment 
freedom of association seems both unnecessary and unwise. The 
union's primary interest in its members' litigation was a desire to 
see that skillful attorneys were obtained so that recoveries might 
fully compensate injuries. The mere fact of association should not 
make this essentially economically-motivated activity meritorious of 
first amendment protection.22 By its decision in Brotherhood, the 
Court has unwisely extended protection of the right of association 
to what seems merely "a procedure for the settlement of damage 
claims."28 
17. 371 U.S. at 431. 
18. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 26, 27 (1958). 
19. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1958). 
20. 377 U.S. at 5. See also id. at 7, where the Court refers to "the right of individ-
uals and the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to 
effectuate a basic public interest." (Emphasis added.) The legislative history of the 
FELA lends weight to the argument that one of its purposes was to facilitate 
litigation by union members. See 42 CONG. R.Ec. 4435- (1908). 
21. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; ••• shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CoNsr. art. 
VI, § 2. Commenting on the supremacy clause and the FELA, the Court bas stated: 
"[W]ben Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it br the Con-
stitution, adopted ••• [the FELA], it spoke for all the people and al the States, 
and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of 
[a state] ••• as if the act bad emanated from its own legislature, and should be 
respected accordingly in the courts of the State." Mondou v. New York, N.H. 
& H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912). 
22. Compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963): "In the context of 
NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences." See 
note 24 infra. 
23, 377 U.S. 1, 10 (Clark, J. dissenting). 
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It would have been preferable, and more harmonious with 
the fundamental nature of first amendment concepts, if protection 
of asserted rights of association were permitted only if the basic goal 
of such activities were the advocacy of beliefs or political ideas. This 
would preclude first amendment protection of activities pointed 
toward the creation of purely economic advantages.24 The question 
in every case should be whether the activity concerns a basic pro-
motion of expression or communication.25 
Lacking any such limitation at present, it must be assumed that 
the right of association now encompasses group legal aid plans. 
Even within this context, however, the principal cases are not clear 
as to the weight to be given a state's interest in the regulation of its 
legal profession. Freedom of association, as part of the first amend-
ment, is applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 26 But first amendment rights are not absolute; their exercise 
may be circumscribed in the presence of an overriding state inter-
est. 27 Several tests have been employed by the Court to determine 
the degree of state interest necessary to justify abridgment of first 
24. To extend the right of association as a first amendment protection to any 
activities could, carried to its logical limit, perhaps lead to an assertion of a right 
collusively to fix prices, etc. The Brotherhood decision suggests use by the Court of 
the first amendment as a substitute for substantive due process, including con-
comitant concepts of reasonableness of state regulaion. In this context, it should 
be noted that if economic liberty were found to be the determinative factor justify-
ing referral programs, some members of the Court would find no constitutional 
basis for attacking state regulations, having long refused to recoguize substantive 
due process limitations in this area. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. North-
western Iron &: Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 
52 (1942). Cf. Mr. Justice White's dissent in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
685 (1962), where he objects to the majority's application of the cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibition to invalidate a state narcotics law, arguing that "if this 
case involved economic regulation, the present Court's allergy to substantive due 
process would surely save the statute and prevent the Court from imposing its 
own philosophical predilictions upon state legislatures or Congress." Id. at 689. In 
any case, at least two specific groups have heretofore been denied the right to 
utilize group legal services, and they will undoubtedly seek to relitigate the point 
in the light of Brotherhood. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor 
Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935) (auto club); People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n 
of Real Estate Tax-payers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933) (taxpayers association). 
See generally The Availability of Counsel and Group Legal Services-A Symposium, 
supra note 13. 
25. A related analysis of first amendment protection problems has been enunciated 
by Professor Emerson, supra note 14. His method of examination would draw a 
distinction between "expression" and "action." The former would be entitled to 
complete protection and the latter protection subject to reasonable regulation. This 
analysis, of course, presupposes that ·the activity is initially within the scope of 
the first amendment and therefore his analysis differs from that in the present 
text, which would delimit protection at a more fundamental stage. 
26. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960). 
27. E.g., id. at 524; American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 
394-95 (1950). But see Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960); Meiklejohn, 
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUF. CT. R.Ev. 245. 
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amendment freedoms.28 In the principal cases the Court balanced 
associational rights against the state's interest in regulating its legal 
profession, and in neither case was Virginia's concern held to be 
sufficient. 
Ad hoc balancing tests have generally given some weight to state 
regulation of local problems.29 The Virginia statutes at first glance 
appear representative of valid local interests. They conform to a 
history30 of state regulation aimed at prohibiting the common-law 
offenses of champerty, barratry, and maintenance.31 When modem 
offshoots, advertising and solicitation, developed, the states reacted 
by prohibiting these activities through statutory or decisional 
means.32 The constitutionality of such interdictions has heretofore 
been sustained,33 and states have usually been held to have a sub-
stantial interest in the regulation of their legal profession, even as 
against asserted first amendment rights.34 
Button's peculiar facts may have dictated the result which over-
came the state interests involved. The Court emphasized the con-
text in which the statutes had been enacted. They appeared to be 
specifically aimed at hampering NAACP activities and were recog-
nized as part of Virginia's resistance to desegregation.35 Brotherhood 
cannot be sustained on the same grounds. There the legislation 
was not directed against the union. Moreover, there was a long 
Brotherhood history of requiring approved attorneys to kick back 
part of their fees.36 Virginia thus would appear to have had a valid 
interest in applying anti-solicitation statutes to this scheme, which 
seemingly presented a substantial danger that high standards of 
28. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ("clear and present 
danger" test); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ("bad tendency" test); 
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra note 27, at 400 ("balancing" test); 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) ("absolute" 
test). 
29. For favorable comment on use of the "balancing" test, see Karst, Legislative 
Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 75. For criticism, see Emerson, 
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912-14 (1963). 
30. A state tradition of supervision lends weight to the validity of its regulation. 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959). 
31. See 14 AM. JuR. 2d, Champerty and Maintenance § 1 (1964); Inciting Litigation, 
3 RACE REL. L. REP. 1257, 1261-63 (1958). See generally 4 BLACKSfONE COMMENTARIES 
•134-36. 
32. In re McDonald, 204 Minn. 61, 282 N.W. 677 (1938); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 279 
(1928). See generally 63 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1502, 1504-07 (1963). 
33. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920); Hildebrand v. State Bar, 
36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950); Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 262 Mich. 1, 
247 N.W. 97 (1933). 
34. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). 
35. For a brief examination of Virginia's "massive resistance" legislation, see 
Birkby 8: Murphy, Interest Group Conflict in the Judicial Arena-The First Amend-
ment and Group Access to the Courts, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 1018, 1021-30 (1964). 
36 377 U.S. at 9 (Clark, J., dissenting). See In re Brotherhood.of R.R. Trainmen, 
13 Ill, 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958), 
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legal conduct might be compromised. Perhaps only the lack of a 
showing by Virginia of specific substantive evils flowing from the 
union's legal referral plan prevented subordination of first amend-
ment rights.87 If this assumption is correct, the implication is that 
in future cases it will be incumbent upon the states to demonstrate 
that particular types of associational conduct will result in specified 
evils that the state should be allowed to prohibit before a state policy 
prohibiting such association will receive approval by the Supreme 
Court.88 
37. This viewpoint is implicit, for example, in the holding of the Richmond, 
Virginia, Chancery Court upon remand of the Brotherhood case. The Virginia court 
held that the United States Supreme Court had not approved of "the commercializa-
tion of the legal profession and 'ambulance chasing' or any of the objectionable 
practices of the Brotherhood in this case." Thus, only that part of the decree which 
enjoined the Brotherhood from advising its members to consult with recommended 
attorneys was unconstitutional, in the view of the Virginia court. Virginia State 
Bar v. Railroad Trainmen, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2387 (Richmond, Va. Chancery Ct., Jan. 
15, 1965). 
38. In State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 374 Mich. 152, 132 N.W.2d 78 
(1965), the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded a Michigan circuit court 
injunction similar to the one granted by the Richmond Chancery Court in the Virginia 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen action. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, 
remanded with permission for amendment of the Michigan State Bar's bill, apparently 
implying that a more specific injunction directed against particular Brotherhood 
practices wonld be constitutional. 
